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SECURITY INFORMATION

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E E N C Y

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for Estimate on Probable Soviet Reactions to Developments in Eastern Germany

DOCUMENT NO. [REDACTED] NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS s6 (1401)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 5 Feb 81 REVIEWER: 018567

1. It is my understanding that this estimate is to be prepared for the Bermuda Conference on 8 July. I believe that either of the following schedules will meet this requirement:

If coordinated: Dissemination to Board Friday 26 June, a.m.; Board meeting Friday 26 June, p.m.; IAC representatives meeting Wednesday 1 July; IAC Friday 3 July (a special meeting); published Monday 6 July.

If not coordinated: (or coordinated only with OIR); Draft to Board Tuesday 20 June, a.m.; Board meeting Wednesday 1 July p.m.; Published Friday 3 July.

2. In addition to the regular material available I have been in 25X1A6b communication with [REDACTED] through the telecon. I attended one telecon session this morning and got some preliminary views and will send detailed questions [REDACTED] for his reply at the 25X1A next telecon session on Friday. Contact is also being made with DD/P and OCI. I will also contact [REDACTED] who is in town.

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3. The following tentative outline is suggested:

a. A brief introductory section. This will include an analysis of the events that have taken place in East Germany since

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~~objectives~~

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the announcement of the SED concessions on 10-11 Jan.,

b. A statement of the basic Soviet position in East Germany.

This section will emphasize the fluid nature of the situation in East Germany at this time and will reaffirm the basic Soviet objectives with respect to East Germany and Germany as a whole. It is these basic objectives that will dictate Soviet courses of action in response to recent developments in Germany.

c. Probable Soviet reaction to the recent events in Germany.

(Tentative estimate of this reaction is presented in para. 4 below.)

I believe that the Board indicated a desire to have several possible courses of action outlined in the paper, but after giving this matter some thought I am of the opinion that the situation is too complicated to list several clear-cut and logical alternatives. Moreover, the paper will be too brief to warrant setting up several obvious straw men. Therefore, I suggest that we present what we believe to be the most logical Soviet course of action.

d. This section will briefly discuss the implications of the estimated Soviet reaction for the US.

4. On the basis of the intelligence available to me thus far, the

25X1A6b telecon communication with [REDACTED], the DD/P briefing, and my discussions

25X1A9a with [REDACTED] the following is my tentative estimate of the probable Soviet reaction: The USSR will not permit its effective control of the Eastern zone of Germany to be jeopardized by a failure to use whatever force may be necessary to crush the current or subsequent

disturbances. However, in implementing

1. Neutral unified Germany.
2. Keep control of E Ger. but weaken W. Germany
through West

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the measures necessary to preserve Soviet control the USSR will attempt to create a facade of order and consent using a minimum of overt force. Since the USSR does not wish the Volkspolizei to be subjected to a test of reliability at this time, it will use Soviet forces wherever necessary. To the extent that the SED concessions of 10-11 June will not be inconsistent with the requirements of security, these concessions will not be withdrawn but may even be expanded and advanced in their implementation. In addition, steps will be taken to give the appearance of a broader base to the East German government by restricting the role of the SED and by giving greater apparent influence to the other political parties of the Eastern zone. After an interval to permit a rehabilitated East German government to establish apparent, (or real) stability, the USSR may request Four-Power discussions at the High Commissioner level. Such a request may be made prior to the September elections.

*Is this to be with
long Th
relaxation
produced
disasters?
How can USSR
assure that
further relaxation
won't again
cause disorder*

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